We examine the longitudinal fortunes of the poorest fifth of U.S. metropolitan neighborhoods, defined as those with 20 percent or higher poverty rates in 1980. We employ logistic regression to identify the factors correlated with 1980-1990 increases and decreases in poverty rates across these poor neighborhoods, and examine whether factors vary by predominant racial/ethnic composition.
Introduction and Research Context
Despite widespread research interest in issues related to neighborhood poverty, the longitudinal fortunes of poor neighborhoods have not been widely or systematically examined. Our lack of in-depth knowledge with regard to the fate of distressed neighborhoods is an important omission since this issue is at the core of important policy questions. Do poor neighborhoods generally stay poor overtime? If so, which ones (i.e., do they have any common racial/ethnic or demographic characteristics)? What factors are correlated with neighborhood poverty changes over time? Answers to these questions are of intrinsic interest to city governments, developers, households, and all types of property owners, given the influence of poverty concentration on property values, tax bases, and a host of social problems Galster 1997, Galster 2002) .
Moreover, precise answers could assist policy makers in targeting scarce programmatic resources more efficiently toward distressed areas in the hopes of neighborhood stabilization or revitalization (Galster, Quercia, and Cortes 2000) . In this paper, we examine the extent to which poor metropolitan neighborhoods, characterized by different racial/ethnic composition, remain poor over time and which factors are correlated with their changing fortunes.
Prior work on the fate of poor neighborhoods has often been grounded in urban ecology, or invasion-succession theory. The dynamics of income group succession were first systematically probed using the model of human ecology developed by the Chicago School of Sociology (Burgess 1925) . 1 Many researchers have used the incomesuccession model as a basis for their own studies of the "filtering" of housing stock though various income and racial groups (Smith 1964 , Grigsby 1971 , Schwirian 1983 , Baer and Williamson 1988 . 1 Researchers often use the invasion-succession model in combination with a life-cycle model of neighborhood change (Hoover and Vernon 1962; Birch 1971) to describe the changes in neighborhoods (Schwirian 1983) . From this perspective, neighborhoods are born (newly constructed), age, decline (deteriorate physically and socially), until they eventually die (are abandoned and demolished). According to this theory, neighborhood decline is inevitable, unidirectional, and not necessarily bad (Temkin and Rohe 1996) . The filtering of housing stock in a given neighborhood provides an opportunity for potential lower income in-movers to improve their housing conditions by moving into this housing from worse housing (Temkin and Rohe 1996) . For thorough reviews of the literature on neighborhood change, see Downs (1981) , Solomon and Vandell (1982) , Schwirian (1986) , Grigsby et al. (1987) , Temkin and Rohe (1996) , and Goodchild, Hickman, and Robinson (2002) .
More recently, concern over neighborhoods with concentrated poverty has motivated empirical research geared toward distilling, analyzing, and predicting the determinants of neighborhood income change more broadly. Several studies have identified through multiple regression analysis determinants of income or social class change across the entire spectrum of neighborhoods (Guest 1974 , Vandell 1981 , Melchert and Naroff 1987 , Coulson and Bond 1990 , Galster and Mincy 1993 , Hammel and Wyly 1996 , Galster, Mincy and Tobin 1997 , Wyly and Hammel 1998 , Baxter and Lauria 2000 .
By contrast, little attention has been given to the dynamics of already poor neighborhoods. There is well-known work describing the trends in the number, locations and demographic composition of U.S. poor neighborhoods (Massey and Eggers 1990 , Kasarda 1993 , Jargowsky 1994 , 1997 , USGAO 1999 and work identifying the predictors of which metropolitan statistical areas will have the biggest number or growth in poor neighborhoods (Hughes 1989 , Jargowsky 1997 The remainder of the paper is divided into three sections. In the next section, we describe the data and methodology used in the analysis. Next, we present the study findings, first in a descriptive manner and then using the results of our logistic modeling.
In the final section, we draw implications for research and policy.
2 Tracts experiencing relative income change between .90 and 1.0 were defined as "stable" and excluded from the analysis.
Methodology and Data
Data for the analysis are drawn from the "Underclass Data Base" (UDB 3 The UDB also reconfigures 1970 tracts to their 1980 boundaries, although this exploration focuses exclusively on the 1980-1990 period. Also, the analysis did not include 2000 census data because of two key factors. First, many tract -level variables needed for the analysis, particularly income-related data, were not released until this paper was written. Second, and even more fundamentally, the laborious process of adjusting tract boundaries to provide valid inter -censal comparisons (i.e., each unit of observation represents identical geographies over time) for all metro areas would require considerable resources and time. Based on the Urban Institute's previous experience with the UDB, the earliest that an explanatory analysis of 1980-1990-2000 changes in poverty of individual tracts (as opposed to merely counting numbers of tracts in different poverty categories, where geographic comparability is less of an issue) could be completed is substantially later in this decade. 4 This parameter was chosen because it represented two standard deviations from the mean value of population percentage in institutions or group quarters for all census tracts. We believe that neighborhoods with an unusually large fraction of residents residing in such institutional settings may evince atypical patterns of change over time, and thus should be excluded from our analysis. 5 We define neighborhood poverty rate as the number of persons in poverty divided by the total population of the tract.
Deleted:
We caution the reader that our classification is not intended to be descriptive of process. Rising poverty neighborhoods may have witnessed poor households replacing non-poor ones, and falling poverty neighborhoods vice versa, but not necessarily.
Available census tract data do not permit us to distinguish in-and out-migration of different economic groups, or the changes in incomes of households resident during the entire decade. Thus, we cannot distinguish neighborhood poverty rate changes produced by selective in-migration, selective out -migration, or incumbent income changes.
The incidence of 1980-1990 rising, stable, and falling poverty neighborhoods were subsequently examined across the 37,995 census tracts that were categorized into four 1980 poverty rate ranges: 0-9.9 percent (low), 10-19.9 percent (moderate), 20-39.9 percent (high), and 40 percent or greater (extreme). 6 In terms of percentiles of all 1980 U.S. metropolitan census tracts arrayed by poverty rate, these categories represent 0-55.3, 55.4-80.5, 80.6-95.8 , and 95.9 and above percentiles, respectively.
We also grouped neighborhoods on the basis of their 1980 racial/ethnic composition, because prior work has shown that these strata differed in their sensitivity to regional economic forces (Galster and Mincy 1993 , Jargowsky 1997 , Galster, Mincy and Tobin 1997 . For cross-study comparability we followed conventions established by these authors. Black neighborhoods are all census tracts with 50 percent or more nonHispanic black population. Hispanic neighborhoods are all census tracts with 50 percent or more Hispanic population. Finally, white neighborhoods are census tracts with 90 percent or more non-Hispanic white population. By imposing these asymmetric racial/ethnic compositional criteria we eliminate mixed neighborhoods that are likely to confound our analysis of poverty dynamics because of racial/ethnic "tipping" instabilities.
Our approach emphasizes the value of ascertaining patterns across the entire set of metropolitan areas. However, by focusing on cross-metro generality, this analysis does not account for contextual details that could possibly influence neighborhood fortunes during the decade. A single-city study could fully discuss, for instance, the role of government intervention and/or assorted public policy programs in shaping neighborhood change, as Fogarty (1977) did. But this approach has the substantial cost of generality.
We think that both approaches have merit and contribute to the body of literature on this subject.
The Fortunes of Poor Neighborhoods: Empirical Explorations

Patterns of Poverty Rate Change by Initial Poverty Level
As can be expected, over the 1980-1990 period most (70 percent) metropolitan area neighborhoods had stable poverty rates (Table 1 ). Yet, about one-third experienced significant changes. About 22 percent of neighborhoods experienced a substantial increase in poverty rate, and about 9 percent experienced a substantial decrease in poverty rate. As a general pattern, the higher the initial poverty rate of the tract, the less likely it was to remain stable over time, and the more likely it was to experience either increases or decreases in poverty.
What about the fortunes of poor neighborhoods in the 1980s? Neighborhoods beginning the decade with high poverty (20-39.9 percent) were as likely to get poorer (probability of .392) as to remain stable (probability of .398), though a significant share (21 percent) experienced a decline in poverty during the 1980s (Table 1 ). The neighborhoods beginning the decade in extreme poverty (40 percent or more) evinced an even more startling pattern: they were almost identically likely to experience stable, increasing, or decreasing poverty rates! These facts clearly belie any simplistic notions that poor neighborhoods typically stay poor or get poorer; their fortunes are much less certain.
( Table 1 around here.)
Patterns of Change for Different Racial/Ethnic Categories of Neighborhoods
As found by Jargowsky (1997), a significantly higher proportion of black and
Hispanic neighborhoods fell within the high and extreme poverty categories in 1980. But of more interest for our purposes, poverty rates in black and Hispanic neighborhoods were generally less stable during the 1980s than in white neighborhoods (Table 1) .
Compared with white neighborhoods, black tracts were half as likely to experience stability (82.7 and 41.7 percent, respectively), three times more likely to experience poverty increase (12.8 and 39.1 percent, respectively), and four times more likely to experience poverty decrease (4.5 and 19.2 percent, respectively). The incidence of poverty change in Hispanic tracts closely resembled that of black tracts. Many of these patterns result, of course, from the fact that minority-occupied neighborhoods started the 1980s with higher poverty rates, on average, and higher poverty rates were associated with greater instability for all racial/ethnic categories, as noted above.
Even when the 1980 poverty rate is held constant, however, the fate of a poor neighborhood appears linked to its racial/ethnic makeup. For 1980 high-poverty neighborhoods, those occupied predominantly by whites were less likely to experience poverty increases but more likely to experience poverty decreases than those occupied primarily by either blacks or Hispanics (Table 1 ). The differentials are less clear in the extreme poverty category, and interpretations must be done with care here because of the small number of white tracts in this stratum.
Regardless of racial/ethnic makeup, however, a neighborhood with a higher 1980 poverty rate subsequently experienced less chance of stability and greater chances of both poverty increases or decreases. Nevertheless, the rate at which these probabilities were modified differed by tract racial/ethnic type. The point at which the likelihood of poverty increase exceeded stability occurred at a lower initial poverty rate for black tracts (the 20-39 percent range) than it did for the other neighborhood types.
What might explain these different trajectories of poor neighborhoods? Are the distinct fortunes of poor white, black, and Hispanic neighborhoods a function of race/ethnicity or some other uncontrolled variables? To answer these questions, we analyze the relationship between a variety of neighborhood characteristics and decadal poverty rate changes for black, Hispanic, and white neighborhoods using multivariate logit models. We present the results of this analysis below.
Foundations of the Multivariate Analysis
Previous multivariate empirical work (Guest 1974 , Fogarty 1977 , Vandell 1981 , Melchert and Naroff 1987 , Coulson and Bond 1990 , Galster and Mincy 1993 , Hammel and Wyly 1996 , Jargowsky 1997 , Galster, Mincy and Tobin 1997 , Wyly and Hammel 1998 , Baxter and Lauria 2000 suggests that five sets of factors likely influence changes in poverty in individual neighborhoods within a metropolitan area. Below, we present the five sets of factors and the way they were operationalized. We also employ the squared values of neighborhood household and housing characteristics to test for possible threshold effects Galster 1997, Galster, Quercia and Cortes 2000) . Variable definitions and summary statistics are presented in Table 2 . Note that, because all variables are defined as percentages (or changes in percentages in the case of county variables), their coefficients can be compared directly without standardization.
( Table 2 about here)
Logit Models of Poverty Dynamics for Neighborhoods with Extreme or High Poverty in 1980
We specify a trinomial logit model with three possible outcomes during the 1980s for each neighborhood that began the decade with either extreme or high poverty rates (20 percent or more): poverty increases, poverty decreases, or stability. The first two options are modeled in relation to the probability of stability, thus the coefficients will reveal how a unit difference in the given explanatory variable changes the log-odds of a poor neighborhood undergoing the particular change in question, relative to remaining stable.
We estimate parameters separately for a sample combining both extreme and high poverty neighborhoods and then within this sample for strata identified by race/ethnicity, as defined before. We consider all tracts with 1980 poverty rates of 20 percent or more as "poor" for our logistic analysis because: (1) there were insufficient observations to estimate parameters for white extreme poverty tracts alone, (2) preliminary runs indicated no significant or revealing differences between high-and extreme-poverty tracts' models, and (3) growing evidence suggests a threshold of upsurging neighborhood social problems when the poverty rate exceeds 20 percent (Galster 2002) .
Likelihood of Poverty Increase. The economic characteristics of the broader area of which the poor neighborhood was a part was clearly the most powerful determinant of whether its poverty increased (Table 3) . The surrounding county's poverty rate changes were associated with increasing odds of poverty increase that were greater by a factor of at least three than any other variable. This is not surprising, given the quasi-tautological relationship between these two variables: a county's poverty rate must move in accordance with the average poverty rates in its constituent neighborhoods. Though of considerably less magnitude, the coefficient of county population change was statistically significant as well, suggesting that poor neighborhoods in faster-growing counties were less likely to evince larger increases in their poverty rates, and vice versa. This may indicate that fast-growing areas push up housing prices across a wide array of housing submarkets. As a result, two selective migration dynamics may come into play. First, non-poor residents of poor neighborhoods may find themselves increasingly "locked in", unable to move elsewhere. Second, some non-poor in-movers t o the metro area may be forced to occupy vacancies wherever they occur, even in poor neighborhoods. In contrast, in depopulating metro areas the reverse may occur and poverty rates rise as increasingly the poor are left behind in the neighborhoods from which the non-poor moved and into which few others move because the regional housing market is so slack.
This explanation is consistent with analysis of individual mobility rates into and out of poor neighborhoods conducted by South and Crowder (1997) .
( Table 3 about Table 4 , especially for 1960-69).
Relatively few characteristics of a poor neighborhood's population at the beginning of the decade were predictive of poverty increases compared to stability. Of special note, racial/ethnic differences in succession probabilities evinced in our crosstabular analysis did not persist in the multivariate analysis. The only predictor proved to be the percentage without high school diplomas, which was associated with a curvilinear relationship with poverty increase probabilities. This relationship suggested that increases in this indicator were associated with reduced chances of poverty increase until the percentage exceeded 16, whereupon the relationship became direct. The parameters were such that poor neighborhoods with the mean value of those not completing high school (22 percent) had modestly lower chances of poverty increases than those with lower percentages, but those more than one standard deviation above the mean (28 percent) had substantially greater chances than any with lower percentages.
Comparison of predictors of poverty increase across racial/ethnic strata of poor neighborhoods reveals the consistent predictive power of county poverty rate changes and, to a lesser degree, county population changes (see Table 3 and the summary in Table   4 ). We could not find any evidence that racial/ethnic composition affected systematically the sensitivity of a poor neighborhood to events in its county.
7 However, several other variables are related to probabilities of poverty increase in considerably different direction or magnitude, depending on stratum. Our analysis highlights the following patterns:
? In poor Hispanic neighborhoods, higher housing vacancy rates, higher percentages of minorities, and fewer high-status households are stronger predictors of increasing poverty than in either white or black poor neighborhoods ? In all strata, higher percentages of renters predict increasing poverty, but the power to do so is greatest in white poor neighborhoods, least in black poor ones ? Pre-1940 vintage poor black neighborhoods are less likely to experience increasing poverty than some newer ones; the opposite is true for poor white neighborhoods ? Surprisingly, the percent minority does not influence in a statistically significant way the likelihood of increasing poverty in poor white neighborhoods, contrary to the pattern evinced in other studies considering all neighborhoods (Vandell 1981) (Table 4 about here.)
Likelihood of Poverty Decrease. Overall, our efforts to develop a predictive model of decreasing poverty were less successful than those related to increasing poverty.
By every criterion, our logit model of decreasing poverty had inferior explanatory power.
8 Assuming for the moment that the phenomenon we measure is typically associated with gentrification, our results confirm those of prior researchers, who found it a difficult phenomenon to model with readily available census data (Laska, Seaman and McSeveney 1982 , Galster and Peacock 1986 , Melchert and Naroff 1987 .
Not surprisingly, countywide change in poverty was the predominant predictor, proving strongly inversely related to the chances of poor neighborhoods experiencing decreasing poverty during the 1980s, across all racial/ethnic strata. County population changes were, however, much less predictive of poverty decreases than increases. This suggests that, as explained above, although county-wide changes in housing market tightness affect the degree to which non-poor households must remain in or move into poor neighborhoods, they cannot help us understand which poor neighborhoods more non-poor households might move into during a gentrification process or which might evince increasing affluence of their erstwhile poor households.
On the other hand, characteristics of a poor neighborhood's households in 1980
were more predictive of poverty decreases than increases. Higher percentages of minority residents were associated with somewhat greater chances of poverty declines, though the marginal impact gradually fell and then ceased when the percentage reached 70 (the mean was 62). This is consistent with studies of gentrification processes that indicate gentrifiers are not deterred from moving into neighborhoods with substantial percentages of minority residents (Black 1975 , Clay 1979 , Gale 1979 . Higher percentages of female heads of families with children were associated with reduced chances of declining poverty until the percentage reached 50, well over the sample mean of 40. A higher percentage of adults with no high school diplomas was associated with reduced chances of declining poverty as well.
Local housing market characteristics predicted poverty decreases in roughly opposite ways than they predicted increases. Poverty decline was more likely in older (pre-1950) vintages of poor neighborhoods and those having greater percentages of owner-occupied dwellings.
Analysis of poverty decreases patterns across poor neighborhoods differentiated by racial/ethnic makeup reveals dramatic differences in household composition effects (Tables 3, 4 ). Poverty decreases in poor black neighborhoods was consistently predicted by percentages of those who did not have diploma s and those who were not employed.
By contrast, poverty decreases in poor Hispanic neighborhoods were predicted by percentages of minority residents, and in poor white neighborhoods the percentages of non-employed and female family heads were most predictive.
As for neighborhood housing characteristics, poor black neighborhoods with more housing built from 1950 to 1969 were less likely to experience poverty decreases, but the opposite was the case for poor Hispanic neighborhoods with more housing built during the 1960-1969 period. Higher vacancy rates were much more predictive of poverty decreases in poor Hispanic neighborhoods than in others. Housing characteristics that we could measure apparently have little impact on the probabilities of decreasing poverty in poor white neighborhoods.
Conclusion
Understandably, much scholarship has focused on what happens to poor people, especially when they reside in poor neighborhoods. Relatively less attention had been given to poor neighborhoods per se. A handful of recent studies have examined how many there are, how they have changed in number and scope, who inhabits them, and where they are located. But only one study, published 25 years ago, has investigated how different types of poor neighborhoods change their poverty rates over time, and whether any distinct socio-economic or demographic predictors of such dynamics emerge.
In this paper, we examined the longitudinal fortunes of poor metropolitan neighborhoods during the 1980s, a period during which concentrated poverty rose dramatically in many urban cores. We found that poor (20 percent and higher poverty rates in 1980) neighborhoods were much less likely to have stable poverty rates during the ensuing decade than less-poor ones, regardless of the predominant racial/ethnic composition of their residents. Although this lower stability was associated with a greater propensity of poor neighborhoods to experience significant poverty increases subsequently, it also was associated with a greater likelihood of significant poverty decreases. In extremely poor (40 percent or more) neighborhoods, poverty decreases of five percentage points or more were almost as likely as comparable-scale increases during the 1980s. Thus, although neighborhoods with low poverty rates are likely to remain so over the course of a decade, neighborhoods with high poverty rates face a much less certain future, but not one that is entirely bleak. This central finding belies any conventional wisdom or implicit assumption of public policy that the future of a poor neighborhood is pre-ordained by its current situation.
The economic and demographic dynamics of the broader region affect most strongly the fortunes of specific neighborhoods located there, consistent with findings of Hughes (1989) , Jargowsky (1997) and Galster, Mincy and Tobin (1997) . Changes in county poverty rates increased the odds that poor neighborhoods in the county would change their poverty rate in the same direction, instead of remaining stable, regardless of their initial racial/ethnic composition. Changes in a county's population had a direct relationship with the likelihood that a poor neighborhood's poverty rate would increase instead of remaining stable, but had no effect on its chances of decreasing. We believe that this asymmetry is due to differences in housing market opportunities created by demand-induced affordability changes in various submarkets, although further research is needed to confirm this contention.
Variations in the socio-economic characteris tics of poor neighborhoods help explain subsequent decreases in their poverty rates, but show less ability to predict increases in poverty (especially among poor black tracts), once other factors are taken into account. For instance, poor neighborhoods with higher proportions of minority households and lower proportions of lower socioeconomic status households (the particular operationalization of import varying across racial/ethnic strata) were more likely to experience declines in their poverty rates during the 1980s, relative to their chances of remaining stable. 9 Assuming that much of what we observed as decreases in neighborhood poverty constituted net in-migration of non-poor households (instead of 9 Though the models and variables are not strictly comparable, these findings generally comport with those of Fogarty (1977) .
increasing affluence of previously poor residents), these findings suggest that "gentrifiers" will be most strongly drawn to minority neighborhoods that, though poor, avoid concentrations of characteristics that have been associated with so-called "underclass" communities: high school dropouts, female-headed families, and lack of employment (Ricketts and Sawhill 1988) . That poor (especially black) neighborhoods varying in such "underclass" concentrations were not distinguished by different probabilities of increasing poverty is an intriguing finding in itself, suggesting something about the relative immobility of non-poor residents of poor U.S. neighborhoods. We believe that this likely is accounted for by lack of affordable housing elsewhere, perhaps in conjunction with discriminatory barriers Dean 1993, South and Crowder 1997) .
Features of the housing market in poor neighborhoods provided further bases for predicting their poverty change. Poor neighborhoods with higher proportions of renter households had increased odds of poverty increases compared to stability, though the strength of prediction was highest for poor white neighborhoods and weakest for poor black ones. This condition was also associated, though less strongly, with lower odds for poverty declines instead of stability. The age of the housing stock also proved important, though in ways typically inconsistent with neighborhood "life cycle theory," lending support to the claims of Guest (1974) and Coulson and Bond (1990) that this theory holds little explanatory power. Poor (especially black) neighborhoods with higher shares of pre-1940 vintage housing proved less likely to evince poverty increases and more likely to evince poverty decreases, compared to stability. This relationship was reversed, however, in some predominantly poor Hispanic and white neighborhoods. Nevertheless, the totality of the findings related to vintage of housing stock is inconsistent with the notion that older poor neighborhoods are more susceptible to increasing poverty over time.
Unfortunately, given the national scale of our analysis, we were unable to measure the impacts of particular local, state, and federal interventions in shaping the fates of poor neighborhoods during the 1980s, as was explored in a local context by Fogarty (1977) . Nevertheless, several policy implications can be derived from the findings. First, consistent with the "rising tide lifts all boats" nostrum, our results regarding the county poverty rate variable imply that the most predictable way to improve the fortunes of poor neighborhoods is to create and maintain a robust regional economy that reduces the overall incidence of poverty. Conversely, intervening to head off increasing poverty in poor areas is rendered much more problematic in the context of a faltering regional economy.
Second, predicting the fortunes of poor neighborhoods is neither obvious nor simple. Poor neighborhoods can take quite different trajectories (Fogarty 1977 ), which we found were at least partly predictable based on the socioeconomic, racial/ethnic and demographic profile of its residents and characteristics of its local housing market. This suggests that, with further development of predictive models such as those prototyped here, planners and policymakers can be guided in their allocation decisions so that their scarce programmatic resources can have the best efficacy in stemming further poverty increases or can best leverage private resources aimed at revitalization.
In particular, two sorts of findings here imply the benefits of targeting interventions: non-linearities and the important differences in predictive relationships observed across neighborhood types. A good example of this need for targeting is with regard to the promotion of homeownership. We found that higher rates of homeownership are likely to be an obstacle to poverty growth in most poor neighborhoods, but the relationship is non-linear and variant across racial/ethnic strata (Table 3 ). The non-linearity suggests, for instance, that boosting the homeownership rate in the average poor neighborhood from 80 to 90 percent will reduce the odds of poverty increase there over twice that of boosting it from 40 to 50 percent. Moreover, our estimates indicate that the impacts will be much more potent in poor white neighborhoods than in poor minority ones, regardless of the initial level of homeownership.
Further analysis is needed, though, before implications such as these can guide programmatic intervention, because the trends observed in the 1980s may not necessarily have persisted in the 1990s. The 1990s were characterized by considerably different macroeconomic, demographic and policy influences. These include a strong economic recovery, welfare reform, and selective migration from the Northeast to the Sunbelt and new immigration both internally and from abroad into California and the eastern seaboard areas. In addition, factors such as the low interest rates, increasing levels of homeownership among minority and low-income households, and an overall thrust of federal housing programs to create income -diverse neighborhoods are likely to have affected in significant ways the fortunes of different types of poor neighborhoods.
Unfortunately, census data with comparable census tract boundaries for 1990-2000 were unavailable to the authors at the time of the analysis. Future research needs to replicate the study as soon as such data become available to ascertain whether structural relationships affecting the fortunes of poor neighborhoods have stayed stable over time.
Overall, the study raises provocative challenges and questions for future research.
First, the further development of predictive models in this field requires a richer set of explanatory variables than may be found in the U.S. decennial census. In particular, variables measuring government-sponsored renewal programs, activities of communitybased organizations, local ecological conditions, proximity to amenities, employment and other poor neighborhoods, crime rates, and local tax/public service packages will be required (cf. Fogarty 1977 , Melchert and Naroff 1987 , Hammel and Wyly 1996 . Ideally, such context -rich data can be collected consistently across a sample of areas to test for generality of relationships, as in the pathbreaking efforts of Wyly and Hammel (1998) .
Second, untangling the complexity of interrelated forces that determine the fortunes of poor neighborhoods will likely require a structural equation modeling effort, perhaps following the lines of Baxter and Lauria (2000) . Third, distinguishing the source of the observed poverty rate change-selective migration flows of the poor, the non-poor, and/or changing incomes of incumbents-is highly desirable in future efforts. In the meantime, two salient conclusions remain: continued poverty is not the only, or even most likely, fate for poor neighborhoods; the fortunes of poor neighborhoods depend both on local and regional context. 
